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ABSTRACT: In some of his more obscure works, Michel Foucault characterises homosexual 
culture as being connected with an interesting practice of friendship. Since homosexual 
relationships cannot be derived from existing norms, they are inherently underdetermined, 
and this means that homosexual culture provides a space for the creation of new types of 
relationship. Inspired by this practice of social experimentation, Foucault puts forward a 
concept of friendship based on the collaborative creation of new relationships in marginal 
spaces. I argue that putting this concept of friendship into practice entails social activism in 
two ways: first, the creation of new relationships in marginal spaces constitutes a form of 
localised resistance to social normalisation, and second, because experimentation with 
relationships presents a challenge to the excessive normalisation of relationships on a societal 
scale. Friendship, for Foucault, is therefore a resource for both local resistance and large-scale 
social change. I also argue that Foucault's work on gay culture deserves more scholarly 
attention because it provides a supplement to his interpretation of the Enlightenment and 
forges a link between friendship and the aesthetics of existence. 
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Philosophical inquiry into friendship in recent years has often sought to comprehend and 
respond to two closely related problems. The first is that friendship is largely understood as 
dependent on shared values and similarity between friends. The familiar notions of a 
”brotherhood of man” and political solidarity are derived from this understanding of 
friendship. However, to think of friendship in such terms is to assume that our shared 
background and common goals will naturally dictate the terms of our relationships. This 
leaves little room for us to exercise creativity in the relationships we build with others. A 
tradition that understands friendship as based on similarity thus deprives friendships of 
creativity and spontaneity. The second problem is that our relationships are strongly 
influenced by social norms, and often to a degree that is detrimental. A key example is 
friendship between men: owing to the way masculinity is constructed in the contemporary 
world, intimacy between men is seen as effeminate and is not readily accepted. Men who 
engage in close relationships with one another are often seen as lacking proper masculine self-
sufficiency and as tending toward homosexuality. As Steve Garlick argues in his paper on 
Foucault, masculinity and friendship, this has left male-to-male friendship in an impoverished 




state, burdened by formalities that aim to establish safe forms of interaction that are free from 
effeminate intimacy.1 So the problem with social norms as guides to friendship is that they 
tend to produce excessively rigid relationships and perpetuate practices that ought to be 
discarded. Recently, thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida have responded 
to these problems by drawing together themes of friendship and difference, showing that 
relationships are not exclusively founded on the shared social background of their 
participants. Others, such as Sandra Lynch have responded by advocating a contemporary 
friendship characterised by creativity and uncertainty.2 Michel Foucault has also addressed 
this topic, developing a concept of friendship based on social experimentation alongside his 
analysis of gay culture. However, in the context of recent debates on friendship, Foucault's 
contribution remains under-appreciated.3 For this reason, I wish to discuss Foucault's concept 
of friendship in detail and show how it fits into the wider scheme of his work. 
 Foucault's most valuable discussions of homosexuality and friendship come from the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. A good selection can be found in the collection Ethics: Subjectivity 
and Truth,4 edited by Paul Rabinow. In these essays and interviews, Foucault describes 
homosexual culture as involved in a process of social experimentation that aims to create 
novel relationships. Although, as I argued earlier, relationships between men are often highly 
normalised, homosexual relationships take place in a ”marginal” space that exists beyond the 
boundaries of conventional masculine culture, where the norms that would otherwise govern 
relationships between men do not apply.5 Homosexual relationships therefore need to be 
created rather than derived from an existing tradition.  Of course, Foucault is not saying that 
homosexual culture is somehow outside of power. Rather, it is disconnected from the most 
totalising and normalising systems of power relations, and characterised instead by very 
dynamic and unstable systems of power relations.  Likewise, Foucault does not believe that 
there are no social norms present in homosexual culture.  Rather, the norms that apply to 
homosexual relationships are fewer and constitute an inadequate guide to creating an actual 
relationship. Homosexual culture is therefore, in Foucault’s terminology, a space of greater 
freedom – where ”freedom” means freedom from normalising effects of power and, 
consequently, the ability to create oneself.6  Homosexual people are thus given a relational 
openness that allows for, and in fact necessitates, social experimentation.  
In the following quote, from ”Friendship as a Way of Life,” Foucault illustrates this 
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idea by describing both the excitement and the difficulty involved in forging homosexual 
relationships. 
  
As far back as I remember, to want guys was to want relations with guys. That has 
always been important for me. Not necessarily in the form of a couple but as a matter 
of existence: how is it possible for men to be together? To live together, to share their 
time, their meals, their room, their leisure, their grief, their knowledge, their 
confidences? What is it to be “naked” among men, outside of institutional relations, 
family, profession, and obligatory camaraderie? 
 
Q. Can you say that desire and pleasure, and the relationships one can have, are 
dependent on one's age? 
 
 M.F. Yes, very profoundly. Between a man and a younger woman, the marriage 
institution makes it easier: she accepts it and makes it work. But two men of noticeably 
different ages – what code would allow them to communicate? They face each other 
without terms or convenient words, with nothing to assure them about the meaning of 
the movement that carries them toward each other. They have to invent, from A to Z, a 
relationship that is still formless.7 
 
Heterosexual romantic life brings an enormous array of norms into play: protocols for dating, 
guidelines for married life, norms that describe male and female roles, rules about how and 
why to show affection, and so on. Even where a relationship is unusual, as in Foucault’s 
example of age difference in a marriage relationship, these norms still provide guidance. A 
homosexual couple, on the other hand, does not have such a wealth of norms to guide them, 
and are therefore left with the task of inventing their own way of being together. 
Homosexuality thus invites the creation of new forms of relationship.  
 Foucault fortifies his position with a critique of the idea of homosexuality as a fixed 
identity. He argues that there is no genuine homosexual identity, style or way of living and, 
accordingly, that people who embrace homosexuality are not realising an inner nature that has 
been hidden by an oppressive heterosexual hegemony. Rather, they must face the task of 
creating their own subjectivities – a task that is bound up with the creation of relationships 
with others. Foucault thus reiterates his argument against the ”repressive hypothesis” in the 
context of homosexuality: 
  
[One] thing to distrust is the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to the 
problem of “Who am I?” and “What is the secret of my desire?” Perhaps it would be 
better to ask oneself, “What relations, through homosexuality, can be established, 
invented, multiplied, and modulated?” The problem is not to discover in oneself the 
truth of one's sex, but, rather, to use one's sexuality henceforth to arrive at a 
multiplicity of relationships. .... The development toward which homosexuality tends 
is one of friendship.8 
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Foucault thus conceives of homosexuality as a space for the construction of novel relationships 
and subjectivities, as opposed to a fixed identity that one can adopt or discover within oneself. 
This approach sets him apart from those who would engage in ”identity politics” and ground 
solidarity among homosexual people in their common interests and identity. Its emphasis on 
similarity between group members and a shared way of life means that identity politics entails 
the creation of a rigid set of norms for homosexual relationships analogous to that which 
structures heterosexual relationships. An identity politics thus promotes conformity. Foucault, 
on the other hand, wants to put us on a path toward the creative and collaborative 
construction of subjectivity. This is essentially what he means by ”friendship” – working 
together with others to build new subjectivities and relationships rather than falling back on 
social norms. It is a concept of friendship that privileges experimentation over traditional, 
institutional or racial bonds. It also privileges heterogeneity over homogeneity, in that it 
anticipates the creation of many different relationships based on the various preferences of 
their participants.  
Given that he uses homosexual relationships as his key examples of friendship, 
Foucault’s discussion may seem to be blurring the line between friendship, sexual relations 
and romantic love. However, this is not the case – he only wishes to avoid making the 
distinction between friendship and romantic love (a distinction that comes packaged with a 
great many social norms describing how these two relationships should work) and is still keen 
to distinguish between friendship and sexual relations. He must do so in order to then draw a 
distinction between the sexual and affective aspects of homosexuality. Foucault argues that 
“homosexuality is not a form of desire but something desirable”9 and that the question is 
“how can a relational system be reached through sexual practices?”10 He thus draws a strong 
distinction between sexual acts and desires on the one hand, and emotional ties on the other. 
There are two reasons why this distinction is necessary. First, Foucault associates sexual desire 
with the concept of a fixed identity. In the case of homosexuality, he is wary of the tendency to 
build a fixed identity around the desire for other men.  That would be a problem because the 
notion of homosexuality as a fixed identity conflicts with the practice of experimental 
friendship that is the ”desirable” aspect of homosexual culture. Second, for Foucault, affection 
can be subversive but sexual relations cannot. On their own, sexual relations are 
unchallenging and can easily be assimilated into our “sanitized”11 society – the medical 
profession, for example, assimilated homosexuality as a form of sexual abnormality. New 
affective ties, on the other hand, are much more dangerous because they disrupt the social 
order, creating new relationships and interfering with existing ones. Therefore, because taking 
sexual desire as the essential part of homosexuality leads us to interpret homosexuality as a 
fixed identity, and because sex does not in itself contribute to the subversion of normalisation, 
Foucault must draw a distinction between homosexual desires and acts on the one hand, and 
the affective relations that occur between people brought together by this desire on the other. 
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We might therefore say that Foucault wants to take the ”sexuality” out of ”homosexuality,” 
since he regards homosexuality as a social phenomenon that is essentially geared toward the 
production of novel relationships and only incidentally involves sex between men. 
 Another interesting aspect of Foucault’s concept of friendship is that it entails two 
distinct activist projects. First, it entails localised resistance to social normalisation. This 
resistance happens when people disconnect themselves from the totalising and normalising 
systems of power relations that generally govern our relationships and, instead, create 
marginal spaces in which novel relationships can be constructed. In the contemporary world 
there are many such spaces, and they are not necessarily connected with homosexuality. There 
are women’s groups, where women can challenge the gender roles given to them by our 
patriarchal society, there are communes and kibbutzes where people come together to pursue 
a collectivistic lifestyle, and there are punk and goth subcultures with members whose values 
differ distinctly from those held in mainstream society.  Each of these spaces provides its 
members with a chance to subvert social normalisation and create new subjectivities and 
relationships in a collaborative environment.  For Foucault, however, the key example of 
localised resistance through friendship is the culture of homosexual sadomasochism (or S & 
M). He argues that the relationships created through S & M are innovations on the traditional 
sexual relationship that can accommodate new forms of pleasure. 
  
I don't think that this movement of sexual practices has anything to do with the 
disclosure or the uncovering of S & M tendencies deep within our unconscious, and so 
on. I think that S & M is much more than that; it's the real creation of new possibilities 
of pleasure, which people had no idea about previously. The idea that S & M is related 
to a deep violence, that S & M practice is a way of liberating this violence, this 
aggression, is stupid. We know very well what all those people are doing is not 
aggressive; they are inventing new possibilities of pleasure with strange parts of their 
body – through the eroticization of the body. I think it's a kind of creation, a creative 
enterprise...12 
 
Foucault thus regards S & M as an experiment in a new kind of relationship, and a key 
example of the practice of friendship. There are, however, two potential difficulties with this 
example.  First, given the character of S & M, it might be objected that relationships of this 
kind simply substitute one code of norms for another. S & M relationships are, after all, no less 
structured than more conventional relationships. This is true, but we need to remember that 
what Foucault condemns is not norms but normalisation. If we create the norms of our 
relationships ourselves rather than relying on those prevalent in society, and we make sure 
those norms are modifiable (which is hopefully the case in S & M relationships) then we can 
avoid normalisation and keep our relational possibilities open. In other words, there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with austere codes of norms as long as they are flexible and 
negotiable. The second difficulty is that Foucault has told us that sex is never genuinely 
subversive, and that friendship is actually about new affective relationships and social 
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structures, yet his key example of friendship is a relationship that is fundamentally sexual. S & 
M may therefore seem like a poor example of subversive friendship. However, there are two 
things to note in Foucault’s defence. First, S & M may be based on sex acts, but nonetheless it 
also creates new affective ties and forms of subjectivity, and therefore qualifies as friendship. 
Second, gay S & M is not just a relationship between two sex partners – it is also a foundation 
for community. For example, Foucault describes the S & M ghetto in San Francisco as a place 
where sexual experimentation has formed a community with its own unique norms and social 
structure.13 People have coalesced into an S & M scene, transforming a subversive sexual 
practice into a subversive community; a counter-culture based on participation in a particular 
kind of novel relationship. Foucault calls this ”ghettoization.”'14 In the case of gay S & M, this 
ghettoization is especially useful. Living in a society where homophobia is prevalent, and 
where discrimination and violence against homosexual people are widespread, the S & M 
counter-culture provides a space where, for once, gay people can set the conditions for social 
interaction. It is not just a space of refuge, but a space of greater freedom, in which people can 
create new identities for themselves, find community, and enrich their lives in ways that 
would not be possible anywhere else. This is another way in which gay S & M culture uses the 
creation of novel relationships as a means of resistance against the excessive normalisation 
encountered in the public realm.   
However, Foucault’s concept of friendship does not simply entail disconnection from 
society and the subversion of social norms in marginal spaces. It also entails a project of social 
activism that aims to challenge the excessive normalisation of relationships across society as a 
whole. The following quote, from an interview entitled ”The Social Triumph of the Sexual 
Will,” captures some of the nature of this project, as well as the excitement and sense of 
humour with which Foucault approaches it: 
  
[MF:] We should fight against the impoverishment of the relational fabric. We should 
secure recognition for relations of provisional coexistence, adoption.... 
 
GB: Of children. 
 
MF: Or – why not? – of one adult by another. Why shouldn't I adopt a friend who's ten 
years younger than I am? And even if he's ten years older? Rather than arguing that 
rights are fundamental and natural to the individual, we should try to imagine and 
create a new relational right that permits all possible types of relations to exist and not 
be prevented, blocked, or annulled by impoverished relational institutions.15 
 
Foucault thus expands the project of experimental friendship into a general challenge to the 
normalisation of relationships. If we take up this project, the narrow range of relationships 
available to us can be abandoned in favour of the cooperative and spontaneous construction of 
novel relationships. This will establish a more fluid way of being together that allows for 
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greater diversity and creativity. Gay culture stands at the forefront of this project, since it is by 
necessity a privileged site for the creation of novel relationships. Interestingly, however, 
Foucault positions the general challenge to the normalisation of relationships as a substitute 
for the gay rights movement. The gay rights movement attempts to create a new scheme of 
relationships that incorporates homosexuality as a legitimate choice [choice?]  of lifestyle, but 
for Foucault this project only confirms the validity of the systems of normalisation that govern 
relationships. As an alternative, he suggests that we fight against the very idea of a rigid and 
totalising code of norms for relationships in the name of freedom and experimentation. For 
this reason we might suspect that Foucault would have been ambivalent about the idea of 
legalising gay marriage. It seems that, given his understanding of homosexuality as a practice 
of experimental friendship, Foucault might have regarded the movement to legalise gay 
marriage as dangerous, because it threatens to ”contaminate” homosexual relationships with 
the rigid norms typical of heterosexual relationships. This conjecture is supported by 
Foucault’s argument that gay rights should be superseded by a ”relational right.” A relational 
right, for Foucault, means “the right to gain recognition in an institutional sense for the 
relations of one individual to another individual,” as opposed to traditional civil rights which 
pertain only to the individual.16 If a right of this kind were upheld, people who engage in 
unconventional relationships would be able to attain the same kind of recognition that 
married couples attain. The dangers inherent in legalising gay marriage would be avoided, or 
at least mitigated, by this approach. However, it is worth noting that it is a very unusual tack 
for Foucault, who tends to avoid using the language of rights and investing in institutionalised 
processes of social reform. It suggests that he has more sympathy for the traditional projects of 
political philosophy than is generally thought , although to what extent remains an open 
question, since he does not develop the argument further. What can be made of the notion of a 
relational right, and what normative limits would need to be placed on such a right, also 
remain open questions.  
 Foucault’s idea of a general challenge to the normalisation of relationships resonates 
with the perceived threat of homosexuality to heterosexual culture. As we have seen, Foucault 
is not simply trying to undermine the particular code of norms governing relationships 
between men – he is disputing the normalisation of relationships in general. Homosexual 
culture, with its potential for experimentation and creativity, is therefore a threat to the 
stability of all relationships, and to the social order that these relationships support. We have 
seen how this threat is received by conservative commentators, who claim that the family is 
the ”fundamental unit of society” and continuously assert that marriage is necessarily a 
relationship between a man and a woman. Their claims, supposedly supported by truths of 
biology and religion, are used to defend the hegemony of a relational tradition that 
marginalises and condemns homosexuality. Homophobia is therefore, at least in some cases, 
not so much a reaction based on moral condemnation of homosexual sex acts as it is a 
conservative attempt to secure the supposedly heterosexual foundations of society. For his 
part, Foucault welcomes the disruption of the social order because it is only through such 
disruption that we can rejuvenate the impoverished relational fabric of our society. He is also 
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quite confident that the general challenge to the normalisation of relationships does not 
represent a true threat to the stability of society.17 
 Despite the urgency of this challenge to the excessive normalisation of relationships, 
Foucault warns against the idea of a homosexual program or agenda. A misplaced emphasis 
on solidarity and common goals, he suggests, can undermine the creativity that makes gay 
culture so significant. 
  
[T]he idea of a program of new proposals is dangerous. As soon as a program is 
presented, it becomes a law, and there's a prohibition against inventing. There ought to 
be an inventiveness to a special situation like ours and to these feelings, this need that 
Americans call “coming out,” that is, showing oneself. The program must be wide 
open. We have to dig deeply to show how things have been historically contingent, for 
such and such reason intelligible but not necessary. We must make the intelligible 
appear against a background of emptiness and deny its necessity. We must think that 
what exists is far from filling all possible spaces. To make a truly unavoidable 
challenge of the question: What can be played?18 
 
According to Foucault, homosexuality must provide a space for innovation and 
experimentation, allowing new forms of friendship to develop without the law-like influence 
of a ”program of proposals.” However, because of this openness, homosexual culture finds 
itself implicated in a social and political project but at the same time denied the option of 
resorting to devices such as a fixed group identity or a fixed agenda that are used to create 
cohesion and solidarity in other groups. In effect, the aim of challenging the relational fabric of 
society sits uneasily with the need for a clear, consistent and effective approach to social 
change, which would seem to require a unifying project. However, Foucault does not regard 
this as a severe problem, and appears hopeful that homosexual culture can maintain an 
awareness of its social and political relevance while not falling into the trap of building itself 
an inflexible program or engaging in identity politics. Perhaps, because it is flexible, diverse 
and locally organised, gay culture can mount a more successful and unexpected attempt at 
social change than other, more conventional movements. 
 Finally, it is important to remember that, although the general challenge to the 
normalisation of relationships begins with homosexual culture, anyone can participate. Even 
heterosexual relationships, if a certain inventiveness is employed, can be subject to 
experimentation. Indeed, much of the formality that comprises these relationships could, and 
perhaps should, be deprived of the semblance of necessity it has attained and re-evaluated 
with a sense of humour and creativity.19 In light of this general questioning of the norms that 
structure our relationships, it might even be argued that it no longer makes sense to talk in 
terms of homosexual and heterosexual relationships, if what we mean by that is that these 
relationships both have their own intrinsic and immutable characteristics. Rather, we should 
talk about a multitude of sui generis relationships that are just, as it happens, between a man 
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and a woman, or between two women or two men, or between more than two people. This is 
what David M. Halperin means when he says that “The future Foucault envisages for us is not 
exclusively or categorically gay. But it is definitely queer.”20 Although the norms that 
determine our relationships are the products of millennia of history and are supported by very 
rigid systems of power relations, they ought to be challenged. Doing so will clear the space 
needed for an experimental friendship in which anyone can participate, regardless of their 
identifying themselves as gay, lesbian, straight or otherwise.  
 Foucault’s work on homosexuality and social experimentation thus describes a novel 
form of friendship. This form of friendship is quite different from what we would call 
friendship in common language – it is not founded on similarity between friends, nor does it 
involve a fixed body of norms that determine how friends relate to one another. Instead, it 
involves the collaborative creation of new subjectivities and relationships as participants 
struggle to come to terms with one another. In this way it mirrors the efforts of many 
contemporary philosophers who wish to challenge traditional notions of friendship. 
Furthermore, like many contemporary contributions to the philosophy of friendship, 
Foucault’s also has political implications, since it entails two distinct activist projects. First, 
there is a project of localised resistance to social normalisation. Foucault conceptualises 
friendship as taking place in marginal spaces that are disconnected from the intricate and 
totalising systems of power relations that would otherwise normalise our relationships. In 
these marginal spaces, new systems of power relations and subjectivities can be constructed in 
a collaborative way, and these relations and subjectivities can remain negotiable and flexible. 
Friendship thus subverts the most dangerous and normalising systems of power relations. 
Second, there is a large-scale project in which we challenge the excessive normalisation of 
relationships across society. Although the normalisation of relationships is one way in which 
the social order is maintained and perpetuated, it can be excessive and place undue 
restrictions on the kinds of relationships we have, as is demonstrated by the limitations of our 
tradition of friendship between men. The experimental friendship described by Foucault 
presents a much-needed challenge to this normalisation, and shows how we might go about 
rejuvenating the relational fabric of our society. Together, these two activist projects make 
Foucault’s a unique and highly practical account of the potential of friendship to create and 
sustain social change. 
 If we look at this project closely, we can see that it parallels Foucault's interpretation of 
the Enlightenment, as given in the essay ”What is Enlightenment?”21 For Foucault, the 
Enlightenment is a phenomenon, a task and an obligation all at once. It is a historical 
phenomenon that consists in a widespread rejection of illegitimate authority and an opportunity 
to transform the public realm. It is also the task, to be undertaken at this specific point in 
history, of preparing for the free use of public reason and thereby expediting humanity’s 
transition from superstitious and dogmatic ”immaturity” to rational ”maturity.” Finally, it is 
the obligation to take advantage of the phenomenon of Enlightenment by carrying out the task 
of Enlightenment – that is, the obligation to bring humanity to a mature state by carrying out a 
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reform of the public realm that promotes the free use of public reason. In much the same way, 
the social experimentation that Foucault sees as linked with homosexual culture is a composite 
of phenomenon, task and obligation. The phenomenon is the creation of new types of 
relationship, beginning in spaces where their relationships are subject to less normalisation. 
The task that comes out of this phenomenon is that of transforming the relational fabric of 
society. The obligation is to carry out this task and thereby mitigate the dangers presented by 
the excessive and harmful normalisation of relationships. The project of social experimentation 
that Foucault describes in his work on homosexuality is therefore quite similar to the project 
he outlines in the essay ”What is Enlightenment?” In both cases we are given an opportunity, 
specific to this period in history, to transform society and create a new and better way of life. 
In the classical, Kantian Enlightenment, this involves setting up the conditions for rational 
public debate and thereby casting off despotism and religious dogma. With regards to 
friendship, it means setting up the conditions for an experimental and creative approach to 
relationships, and thereby freeing ourselves from the limits imposed by the impoverished 
relational fabric of society. 
 However, this project is quite distinct in character from the two projects that appear as 
complementary themes in Foucault’s discussion of the Enlightenment. First, there is what 
Foucault calls the ”Enlightenment attitude’ – a process of social critique based on Kant’s 
concept of the free use of public reason. Foucault’s project of social experimentation is similar 
to the Enlightenment attitude in that it aims to transform society, but differs in that it is not 
concerned with the ameliorating the systems of power, knowledge and ethics that comprise 
society. Rather, it anticipates the creation of a number of marginal spaces that are only 
minimally connected to large-scale social structures. In other words, it is not a project of large-
scale social critique, but one involving friendships and small communities. The other theme 
that appears in Foucault’s discussion of the Enlightenment is that of an aesthetics of existence. 
Foucault develops this theme through a discussion of Baudelaire’s dandyism. The social 
experimentation that Foucault calls friendship is similar to the aesthetics of existence in that it 
aims at the transformation of the self (indeed, Foucault suggests that his concept of friendship 
is a type of aesthetics of existence, since it involves an “art of life”22) but, unlike the aesthetics 
of existence described in works such as The History of Sexuality,23 it is not simply a matter of 
self-transformation. Rather, it also involves the transformation of others through a negotiable 
and collaborative process of relationship construction. Foucault’s concept of friendship is 
therefore quite similar to his work on the ancient practice of parrhesia,24 in that it represents a 
move from a solitary aesthetics of existence toward a more collaborative aesthetics of 
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 There are therefore both important similarities to and important differences between 
the project of social experimentation found in Foucault’s work on gay culture and his 
interpretation of the Enlightenment. On the one hand, both are presented as composites of 
phenomenon, task and obligation, and both anticipate processes of social change linked to 
specific moments in history. On the other hand, however, the project of social experimentation 
presented in Foucault’s work on homosexuality differs from the Kantian project of social 
critique and the aesthetics of existence that are presented as the two complementary themes of 
the Enlightenment. Rather than conforming to the traditional dichotomy between individual 
self-transformation and societal transformation, Foucault’s concept of friendship as social 
experimentation takes a middle path and focuses on small communities and friendships. This 
approach to social change has only gained currency quite recently, but it nonetheless bears the 
ethos of the Enlightenment – the notion that we have an opportunity, at this moment in 
history, to transform ourselves and our society in a fundamental way. We should therefore 
understand Foucault’s work on homosexual culture as presenting a third, historically distinct 
aspect of the Enlightenment project, complete with a new model of social action that 
represents twentieth-century theoretical developments. 
 In conclusion, Foucault’s work on homosexuality and friendship is certainly worth 
more attention than it has been given. There are several reasons why. First, it gives us a new 
concept of friendship, connected with two promising activist projects. This contribution is of 
particular relevance to contemporary debates on friendship in continental philosophy, which 
tend to focus on the relationship between friendship, difference and social norms. Second, 
Foucault’s work on friendship supplements his interpretation of the Enlightenment by 
describing a form of social action focussed on the creation of novel relationships between 
friends and within small communities. This approach to social action is, for the most part, a 
twentieth-century achievement, and provides a middle path between the Enlightenment 
projects of large-scale social reform and an individualistic aesthetics of existence.  Third, this 
work brings the aesthetics of existence, which is often described by Foucault as a solitary task, 
into a collaborative environment. Finally, on a biographical note, Foucault’s work on 
homosexuality and friendship gives us an interesting insight into the connection between his 
intellectual work and his social activism. In fact, the work itself is a way of participating in 
social change by promoting homosexual culture and its challenge to the normalisation of 
relationships. It is perhaps the high point of activism in Foucault’s writings. 
 
  
 
